Why We Lost Iraq

As I alluded to in my last post, ISIS will take Iraq and they will take it soon. When they do, it will represent a massive strategic and policy failure. For almost 30 years, our policy toward Iraq has been inconsistent at best. Over the course of the last two administrations, our policy has been an utter failure. Obama's precipitous withdrawal from the middle east is only one of the reasons we have now lost. Likewise, the Bush administration shares an enormous portion of the blame for having muddled strategic goals, poor execution and a generally messy set of policies to handle our inevitable exit. So, here is how we lost.

Shifting Strategic Purposes

W, who I voted for twice incidentally, stood atop an aircraft carrier and declared that major combat operations in Iraq were over. Behind him was a banner that read "mission accomplished." At the time he made that speech, he was correct. The mission had been accomplished. The original strategic goal was to secure weapons of mass destruction and affect "regime change." In the first 100 days of the war, Iraqi soldiers laid down their weapons, fled into the desert, and we watched as Saddam Hussein fled Baghdad. It was touted as the greatest and swiftest military advance in history. It was not, but I will leave that for a later discussion. In the months that followed, we determined that there were no weapons of mass destruction. Hussein had been, foolishly, pretending that there were in order to keep his own people (and Iran) in check.

Had W stopped there, declared victory on that aircraft carrier and withdrawn our forces, we would be in basically the same position we are in today - maybe better. The Shia would have taken over the government, they would have excluded the Sunnis, and there may have been a civil war. Al Qaeda may have gotten involved, but maybe not. In any event, our two stated strategic goals - WMD and regime change - had been accomplished. It was time to withdraw.

We did not withdraw, however. Instead, we allowed "mission creep" to redefine the mission. Having believed that we won the war with such ease, we assumed we could build the nation with similar ease. After all, why withdraw an enormous military presence that cost us so much to place there? Why not try to "establish a Muslim democracy"? Why not "maintain a base for counter-terrorist operations in the middle east"?

And this is where I will always part ways with the hawks. I will confess, I generally approve of America using military power where the objectives are clear, and only where the party in power agrees that once those objectives are met, we are done. Mission creep is insidious and always leads to disaster. Had W's strategic objective been from the beginning "to establish a beachhead in the middle east from which to launch counter-terrorist operations," I would have approved. I would expect the military to devise a set of secondary and tertiary strategic objectives to accomplish that goal. What I cannot abide, is a President and military setting a primary strategic goal and then deviating from it. That is just lazy thinking.

The moment the strategic mission in Iraq changed, we lost.

Failure to use Decisive Force

The so called "Powell Doctrine," named after General Colin Powell, dictates that massive, overwhelming military force be used in order to swiftly accomplish tactical and strategic goals. I'm all for it. We won World War II in 4 years. We affected an end to World War I in two. Yet, we could not defeat Al Qaeda and other Sunnis in Iraq after a decade of fighting. Any way you look at it, that is a massive failure, both militarily and politically. 

After suffering numerous military setbacks in 2005 and 2006, America decided on the strategy of the "Surge" in 2007. This was a large deployment of American forces meant to quell "uprisings" in northern Iraq, the same place that ISIS controls now. The Surge was a direct result of the military's failure to predict one of the most common and obvious dangers associated with invading a country - guerrilla warfare.

As our tanks rolled across Iraq, they met very little resistance. Our commanders assumed that this was because of the "shock and awe" of our airpower and the inherent superiority of our forces. In fact, the Sunni-Iraq military had decided that the objective, defeating the U.S., was impossible. So, what they did was lay down their arms and blend into the population, biding their time, waiting to reorganize in smaller groups and strike. Yes, like the Viet-Cong. No, we did not learn from that.

The last command that any general gives when he is fighting for his own land and defeat is inevitable is to retreat to the hills and continue the fight if at all possible. Those orders are followed to varying degrees, depending on the perceived worthiness of the cause. In our own country, for example, at the end of the civil war, Lee surrendered, but not all of his subordinates did. Many Confederates still believed their cause was just and, in any event, they were too proud to surrender. They retreated to the hills or blended back in to the population and became the Klan, the Knights and any other number of other terrorist groups that continued to fight the civil war for another 65 years. 

The Sunnis did the same thing. Iraqi soldiers laid down their arms and retreated to the hills to continue the fight another day. We did nothing to stop them. We were content with the thought that we were "kicking their ass," and that they were "scared," or fled due to their own cowardice. Well, they don't look scared now, and they didn't look so scared in 2005 when they were blowing up our soldiers. We failed to anticipate this guerrilla war. It's actually hard to say that out loud, but we didn't, and it led to this result.

While it is true that you should leave your enemy an avenue of retreat, you should do so only if it suits your overall strategic plan. Allowing these men to retreat was a mistake. We should have cut off their retreat, interned them as POWs, processed them and, maybe, released them. That is how you fight a war. That is how we fought World War I and World War II.

Guess what, war is ugly and expensive. Massive numbers of POWs means you are winning the war. It also means they can't retreat into the hills to fight you a decade later. Our failure to use decisive force, cut off their retreat, and annihilate their will to fight cost us the war.

Failure of Will

Once the mission changed and once it was clear to most Americans that we had made some kind of mistake, either in policy or strategy, we lost our will. Losing will in a long, drawn out war is not uncommon, nor is it a reflection of us as Americans. The fact is, we have an uncanny ability to predict the importance, to us, of continuing military action. We also have a tendency to broadcast our will to the other side. 

We had an entire election about the war in Iraq. We broadcast our intentions to our enemies when we elected Obama. He won, in large part, because he opposed the war in Iraq. Romney was promising an uncertain result and perpetual war without a strategic goal. I never once heard him mention an actual goal other than to win, or quell the uprising, which was vague at best. Regardless, we announced our intention to withdraw as a nation, and the enemy was listening.

And what were we fighting for? We had accomplished our original goals. Did we really want to lose our soldiers to build a nation for people who generally hate us? Really? The American people answered with a resounding no and elected someone basically unqualified for the presidency to avoid another term of perpetual war.

Precipitous Withdrawal

Obama, of course, withdrew in about the worst way possible. His failure was his inability to appreciate that, even if we shouldn't have been there, we are there now and we have a strong interest in the outcome. Instead, his team of amateurs decided that we would just leave.

It took less than 18 months for ISIS to regain control of the north. It will take less than 6 months for them to control the remainder of Iraq. The manner of withdrawal was terribly short sighted. It was a retreat without any thought to the consequences. The Bush administration made serious strategic and policy errors, but the Obama administration created the trifecta with what amounts to a surrender.

I have no doubt that we will be fighting Al Qaeda now for another 20 years. They will attack us again, and we will suffer again. We will wage war again in the middle east and, we will make mistakes again. But both parties, both administrations are to blame. The rationale behind the Surge was to stamp out "Al Qaeda In Iraq," now known as ISIS. Bush failed, even with the surge, to wipe out the enemy. Obama's rationale behind surrendering is unclear, but the consequences are not. Al Qaeda has won the war because they had the will and the strategic vision to accomplish that goal. Ironically, the entire purpose of the latter half of the war, to "stamp out Al Qaeda" and other terrorist groups in Iraq, has now become the most humiliating part of the whole ordeal. Hussein's forces and Al Qaeda have now joined together to take over the country. As a result, the war will now only be seen as  a total, complete and unmitigated failure to achieve any long term strategic goal.

The 5 Reasons ISIS Will Win Iraq

1.  Will

"All wars are first won in the temples." ISIS has demonstrated a vicious will, exterminating everyone in its path. Its will outstrips the will of the Shia, who have committed a paltry number of troops and militia to halting a well organized military advance. It goes without saying that the United States possesses no will to intervene, nor should it. Shia fighting Sunni in the Middle East, while creating instability, will also create a situation of which the United States can take advantage. In fact, the only reason to intervene would be to head off Russian or Chinese involvement in the civil war. I will suggest that, if it appears others will try to take strategic advantage, we should intervene and intervene with decisive, violent and merciless force - and then stay there.

2.  Organization

It is no surprise to me that ISIS, which actually is made up of both Al Qaeda and former Saddam forces, is better organized than the Shiites. Sunni make up only 30% of Iraq, but they ruled the country for decades. Saddam Hussein, a violent but well organized man, understood how to maintain power through the use of military force. At one point, he had reigned over Iraq's majority Shiite population and managed to fight a brutal war against Shiite Iran. His military was fierce, dedicated and professional. The Shiite militias did not stand a chance then and they do not stand a chance now. The Iranian "Kuds" force (Iranian special forces) are probably pretty well organized themselves, but they are badly outnumbered, and lack substantial military equipment. They will make the fight more brutal but, ultimately, they will retreat when they see that strategic victory is impossible.

3.  Military Equipment

Which leads me to number three. ISIS has taken over more than half of Iraq and confiscated a substantial amount of military hardware, including U.S. made weaponry. They are well equipped, and because they have all been trained to use the equipment during the Hussein years, they will be effective. The Shiite militias are poorly trained, have older equipment, and are poorly organized. 25 guys with AK's in a fleet of Toyota pickups are still no match for one tank.

4.  Strategic Purpose

Akin to Will is strategic purpose. ISIS has a strategic goal in mind. Namely, to take over a nation-state, organize a large Sunni military presence in the Middle East, and then attack their enemies. While they may focus on the United States, their primary focus will always be the Shia. The Shia, on the other hand, have only a limited strategic goal in this conflict. While they do not want to see a Sunni Iraq, they already have a nation-state from which to develop their military and political objectives. Holding Iraq, while important, is secondary to maintaining their perceived hegemony in the Middle East. The Shia make up such a large majority of Muslims that they take their military and tactical capabilities for granted. They assume that they can win any war by sheer numbers. They cannot, and they never have. Saddam Hussein proved that in the decades that he ruled Iraq and the decade that he fought Iran to a humiliating stalemate.

5.  Lack of Western Commitment

I touched on this in number one. The only way the current Iraqi government is going to prevail is if some powerful country from outside the middle east intervenes. I do not put it past Putin to meddle. For him, this is yet another golden opportunity to insert Russian influence into the vacuum left by Obama's global retreat. Russia has already made significant commitments to Iran, and he could strengthen his bargaining leverage by establishing a military foothold in Iraq. 

That said, there has been almost no sign that any other country intends to intervene. U.S. airpower and special forces will not make a decisive impact on the outcome, I am sorry to say. Airpower alone has never been decisive and special forces are too small in number to occupy and hold territory.

Conclusion

I understand that it is difficult to watch Iraq fall after so much was lost and so many men and women sacrificed so much. Certainly American pride has been shaken to the core, just like when we evacuated Vietnam. The fact is, whether to you agree or disagree with the decision to go in, we fought the war all wrong, and we were never willing to stay long enough to truly build a nation. We turned over power to the Iraqis too soon and we left too soon. We also never fully defeated the Sunnis or Al Qaeda before the withdrawal, leaving the Iraqi government extremely vulnerable. 

Critics will argue that we precipitously withdrew because we had no choice - the Iraqis threw us out. Fine, but I submit to you that it really never should have been their choice. They didn't need a feckless interim government. They didn't need U.S. military hardware. They didn't need autonomy. They needed to surrender, be occupied, be re-educated, submit, then given a new form of government. Then we needed to maintain a large military presence in the country, basically forever, to watch over things and ensure compliance with the peaceful democratic ideals we died to bring to them. That is principally how you wage an idealogical war. But, because we were not willing to fight the war with conviction, we lost the peace.

The Point of No Return

I have toyed with the idea of writing a blog for years. All of the typical questions popped into my mind: What would I write? Who would read it? Do I really have anything to say? Then it occurred to me that really what I want to do is write for myself. As a lawyer, I meet so many interesting people from all walks of life. Each has his or her own ideas about the direction of the country, the problems we face, and the problems we will face. In some ways, I think I have a unique perspective.

I grew up in Atlanta, Georgia, the son of a labor and employment lawyer. After high school, I attended the University of Georgia. While there, I was an active member of the Demosthenian Literary Society. Demosthenian, named from the Greek philosopher Demosthenes, is a parliamentary debate organization, first founded in 1802. At Georgia, I gained a deep love for debate and the exchange of sometimes wildly different ideas. 

I graduated with a degree in history, with a focus on foreign policy, and promptly began wasting my degree as a bartender. I later bought a bar and restaurant and ran that, working 16 hours a day, until my father suggested I go to law school. His reasoning was simple and compelling. "Son," he said, "if you work this hard as a lawyer, you'll be rich." I was persuaded.

Since graduating from the Southern Illinois University school of law in 2002, I have been consistently practicing in state and federal courts throughout the country. My primary focus is labor and employment law, but I handle litigation and trial for many smaller clients in other areas of the law. I handle cases for both employers and employees, but 95% of my practice is representing manufacturing plants in employment litigation.

Part of my reluctance to start this project has been because litigation has become such a nasty business. Undoubtedly, opposing lawyers will comb through this blog, looking for any weakness they can exploit or any insight they can gain. Employees who are suing my clients will undoubtedly post inappropriate comments here and fill my inbox with hate mail.

On balance, however, I've concluded that those things could happen anyway and, in any event, this is not a legal blog. So, here it is, the point of no return. I sincerely hope you enjoy the discussion, and thoughtful comments are always welcome.